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smartphones to establish the connection with cloud server
for data exchanging. The complexity of this
communication among various paths generates security
vulnerabilities such as personal information leaking and
privacy hacking by hackers. Financial loss is possible as
some fitness wearable devices allow their user to access
their bank account for quick payment to selected financial
institute or agency [21].

Abstract—Wearable technology allows for consumers to
record their healthcare data for either personal or clinical use
via portable devices. As advancements in this technology
continue to rise, use of these devices has become more
widespread. In this paper, we examine the significant security
and privacy features of three health tracker devices: Fitbit,
Jawbone and Google Glass. We also analyze the devices'
strength and how the devices communicate via its Bluetooth
pairing process with mobile devices. We explore possible
malicious attacks through Bluetooth networking. The
outcomes of this analysis illustrate how these devices allow
third parties to access sensitive information, such as the device
exact location, which causes the potential privacy breach for
users. We analyze and compare how unauthorized party may
access the user data and the challenges to secure user data on
three wearable devices (Fitbit, Jawbone, and Google Glass)
security vulnerability and attack type.

Researchers raise concerns about the security of wearable
devices. HP labs found that most of the wearable devices
are vulnerable to user data security breach because of poor
security firmware system in devices [24]. In many cases
researchers point out that firmware update vulnerability is
the main cause in wearable devices because these devices
allow attackers to inject malicious codes [25]. At the
Hack.lu 2015 security conference in Luxembourg [26], a
researcher reported that PC can be affected through
malicious code injection when Fitbit devices plugging to
PC through Bluetooth pairing within 10 seconds.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The weakness of firmware, the gateway of apps and the
service of server are the main concern about security and
privacy leakage of wearable fitness devices. The wearable
devices build the connection through smartphone apps as a
gateway to connect web service, the open interface for
interoperability. Hackers target the weak point of these
interfaces which has become a security threat for these
wearable devices [27]. Therefore, the vulnerability such as
SQL injection and Cross-Site Scripting (CSS) attacks takes
place through the connection gateway [28].

Wearable health devices are most commonly used for
health fitness and user health status recording purposes.
These devices have grown significantly in recent years and
these wearable devices are normally in fashion wearable
forms such as watches, glasses, wristbands or jewelry items
[1]. In 2018, nearly 3.7 billion new Bluetooth enabled
devices were shipped worldwide to consumers [2].
Wearable devices are connected to the cloud server through
the internet that enables device owners to interact with their
user records and exchange personal information such as
heart rate, geolocation and daily eating habit. These
wearable devices are connected to internet, such as Wi-Fi
networks, more than ever before which have become part
of the Internet of Things (loT). In theory, connecting
devices through loT allows users to control or automate
digital tasks so that various unexpected user data such as
habit, daily activities, and location tracking records are
delivered to third party observers [14]. Wearable devices
provide less security compared to computing devices
because of limited bandwidth and processing power [3].
Therefore, wearable devices bring new challenges in terms
of user’s security and privacy that increase to an array of
possible attacks due to the limitation of its space and
memory capacity. Fitness devices require pairing with

In this paper, we discuss the strength and features of
wearable devices and present detailed analyses and
research reviews on user data security and privacy attacks
that occur due to poor security firmware in wearable
devices. The goal of the analyses is to understand security
and privacy on wearable devices and user data transferring.
We analyze the security and privacy issues of three main
wearable devices including Fitbit, Jawbone and Google
Glass, based on various related prior works and research.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses
related works. Section III describes the security and privacy
of three wearable devices Fitbit, Jawbone and Google
Glass. Section IV compares the weakness and provides
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computation values into memory and the wearable devices
would generate this count value to the server as a valid
encoded frame.

suggestions to secure the devices. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper and future work.
II.

RELATED WORKS

A group of researchers [22] (University of Toronto)
investigate Bluetooth privacy, data integrity and
transmission security of some fitness trackers. They
discover that all of the wearable trackers have numerous
user data security and privacy issues. They release the key
findings of security and privacy leakage in many of the
fitness trackers except Apple Watch. The Jawbone UP
application consistently sends out the user’s precise
geolocation while Bellabeat, Garmin, and Withings
application failed to use transit-level security that causes
data visible in transmission level [23].

Wearable devices can help users monitor their health and
fitness by tracking data from movements to heart rate and
even blood pressure. Meanwhile, continued research
actively focused on privacy and security of these devices.
Research have been published with the focus on the user
data security and privacy leakage for wearable devices. In
2014, Britt Cyr, published the user data security and
privacy properties analysis of Fitbit devices focusing on the
security weaknesses between Fitbit Bluetooth devices and
a smartphone application during traffic synchronizing [4].
They found that Fitbit collected data without providing
device owner’s consent and that MAC address of Fitbit
devices never changed which enabled correlated attacked
[11]. Researcher reported that MITM attacks intercepted
the BTLE credential during device pairing over TLS [4]. A
follow-up study in 2018 by Matthew [5] analyzed three
devices; Fitbit, Pebble and Jawbone and found out that all
three devices exposed their connection forming packet
when pairing that would enable server vulnerable attack
because these packets allow an attacker to follow the
connection after it is initiated [5].

III.

ANALYZING WEARABLE HEALTH DEVICE

A. Analysis of Fitbit
The Fitbit tracker [6] tracks various user’ activities
including number of steps walked; sleep pattern and quality
as well as other personal health measurements such as body
temperature, pulse rate, food habit, and body weight. Fitbit
introduced a series of technology on workout tracking such
as PurePulse, SmartTrack and Sleep Tracking- a
technology that automatically recognizes users’ exercises
and record the data through the smartphone app.

In 2016 Ke Wan Ching, performed security analysis of
wearable devices especially Google Glass that is eye wear
device and they found the lack of authentication due to
unsecure PIN system [17]. In addition, Seyedmostafa and
Zarian[18] revealed that Google Glass can take pictures
and record videos without the user's consent that breaches
the user’s privacy. One of the security and privacy concerns
has been regulated from various research forums, the
application of mhealth apps that makes an interaction
between wearable devices and mobile phones to visualize
the data record of users. In the Data Protection in the EU
[19], the European Commission emphasizes data
protection that tracking and monitoring patient’s health
information such as activities, location visited, and dieting
habits would be severely vulnerable in future by using
wearable devices and their applications. Similarly, a report
[20] discusses user’s data security and confidentiality that
would be challenged to ensure compliance with HIPPA
regulation due to wearable health devices vulnerability and
their data compromising by third parties. Wu (Min Wu,
2019) identified that even a trustworthy network within the
organization in terms of the enforced process of data
encryption and authentication mechanism is vulnerable
because third parties may gain elevated privileges due to
secret access key and certification process from users’
ends. They suggested that security key agreement and
distribution among the node in the network could be the
strong possible authentication process in accordance with
HIPAA guidelines for privacy and data security [20].

Strengths of Fitbit Devices: SmartTracking activities –
Fitbit used a simple accelerometer that is called a smart
algorithm. SmartTrack uses a 3-axis accelerometer to
identify the intensity and patterns of the user movement and
determines the type of activities. To collect thousands of
possible activities accurately, a series of algorithms are
applied to that data that shaping down all activities as a
singular exercising in database server [6]. To measure
heartbeat, a photoplethysmography, a low-cost and simple
optical technique that can be used to detect blood volume
changes, is used for PurePulse. Photoplethysmography is a
light base technology used to measure blood circulation
and the volume of the blood in the wrist changes. With
Photoplethysmography, Fitbit uses optical heart rate
monitor to detect the pulse by shinning a green light
through the skin to see blood flow.
Data Security of Fitbit Devices: Data security is one of
major security vulnerabilities found in many mobile health
devices. Fitbit continuously adds software patches to
improve the user data security and privacy for its devices
[7]. For authentic security purposes the device protects data
through regular firmware update. However, lack of
authentication is one of the most vulnerabilities in Fitbit
devices that generally occurs on trackers side [7] so the
potential cybercriminal can easily collect the user personal
data without their consent.
The University of Edinburgh conducted research on how
personal information could be stolen from Fitbit divides
such as the Fitbit One and Fitbit Flex wristband [8]. It was
found that intercepting messages transmitted between
cloud server and fitness tracker is possible. This allowed
researchers to access users ‘personal information that
would cause sharing unauthorized personal data to the third
parties [8].

A blog of vulnerability of fitness tracker [21] pointed out
that most wearable fitness trackers need to be initiated as
build in security mechanism while connecting other
devices or applications for data collection. The wearable
devices’ data are stored in a local server without an
encryption key. The lack of security mechanism causes the
devices extremely vulnerable to cybercriminal attacks [21].
In this scenario, cybercriminal can inject random step
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Fitbit System Overview: The Fitbit devices are designed
to rest in data buffer locally on the device and devices are
worn by the user all day. Data synchronization is
performed through smartphone applications for Android,
iOS and desktop. Fitbit devices send the user’s activity to
the Fitbit cloud server over Wi-Fi or internet connection
during data synchronizing. During data synchronization,
the Fitbit application forwards the user’s activity data to
Fitbit warehouse. User data activities are fetched from
Fitbit devices during each synchronization.

Fitbit Device Tracking: Since devices originate
randomized addresses that automatically configure
periodically, it attempts to improve privacy instead of
maintaining one permanent address [15]. But it was
discovered by researchers that the device to be tracked even
as its random address originates. Random data is a unique
identifier of the device that is supposed to be changed
periodically but in that case this identifier doesn’t change
in sync with the address. In this case, the research team
found that Fitbit devices lack address changes or
randomization at all which is considered an extremely
susceptible to tracking even without the use of a sniffer
algorithm. [11]. The research further addressed that
restarting the Fitbit device or draining its battery did not
change the access address. It indicates that the data could
be tracked in Fitbit devices if the Fitbit’s access address
never changes [11].

In Figure 1, synchronization is formed over Bluetooth
between Fitbit devices and smartphone or personal
computer. The BTLE [9] (Bluetooth Low Energy) is used
for data synchronization between smartphones application
or personal computers so over internet/Wi-Fi Fitbit Cloud
service transpires in an encrypted session.

B. Analysis of Jawbone
Jawbone is a powerful health activity monitor, food and
sleep tracker device that is wearable on the wrist like Fitbit
wearable device. Jawbone uses an internal accelerometer
and algorithm to track users’ day to day activities and
suggests helpful tips and lifestyle through the
accompanying Up app [12]. Jawbone UP24 fitness tracker
had a big upgrade from its original design, with new
features and resolving some serious first generation issues
[16].
Strength of Jawbone: The Jawbone UP tracker has a
feature such as a hardware button to save battery from
drainage while not aiming connection. One of the good
security features of Jawbone is the Bluetooth activation
switch that requires user paring pin code to initiate
communication with smartphone applications. While
establishing Bluetooth connection, the device starts
publicizing and penetrating for other peers after pressing
the button. In this situation, when paired devices are not
reachable to connect demand devices, the device responds
to connection requests from other Bluetooth devices.

Figure 1: The Fitbit system components that shows the attack
surface into five medias.

Analyzing Bluetooth Communication: Mobile health
devices have built-in Bluetooth that permits devices such
as smartphones, computers, and peripherals to transfer data
or voice wirelessly over short distance [10]. Bluetooth is
measured a reasonably protected wireless connection that
is encoded, stopping casual snooping or eavesdropping
from other devices in short distance. However, there is
always security risk involved such as malicious attacks
through Bluetooth networking by hackers. For instance,
“bluesnarfing” is the unauthorized access of information
from a wireless device through a Bluetooth connection,
while “bluebugging” allows attacks to take over all
functions of mobile phone [10]

Data Security of Jawbone Tracker: As the Bluetooth LE
connection described, devices should change the Bluetooth
device MAC address randomly in order to improve the
privacy instead of maintaining one permanent address [38].
But unfortunately, the Jawbone tracker device is found
absent in this security feature since it uses the same MAC
address permanently. This causes the potential users data
security and privacy issues, when the users can be traced
easily for their precise location and user data could be
manipulated by the attacker. While using GattTool
command is one of the ways to write and read the potential
features of the device, shell script is another way to pretend
a Denial of Service(DoS) attack for originating connection
requests and reading the characteristics of the devices. In
this scenario, if the Jawbone UP tracker is connected to the
paired device, it does not accept the further connection
request.

A research group from Boston University recently has
discovered a vulnerability in several Bluetooth devices
including the Fitbit watch that could allow third parties to
gain sensitive information from the devices such as exact
locations [11]. The researchers identified that the
information leak stems from the way different Bluetooth
devices communicate with one another to establish a
connection. In pairs of Bluetooth for transmitting
information between two devices; one device must first
establish central role in the connection and other device
play peripheral role [11]. For example, in a pair of
Bluetooth Fitbit SmartTrack to iPhone, iPhone would play
the role of central device and Fitbit SmartTrack would be
the peripheral device that indicates available connection
where the signals contain the IP address of a mobile device
and a payload containing data about the connection [11].

Jawbone Up Tracker Overview: In [13] Parson’s
research team found that during the routing use of the
device application, Jawbone UP trackers passively share
the user precise current location. It was unclear to the
researchers what the reason was for this passive location
3

tracking and that the collection of information was not
linked with some given fitness activities. In general, when
users open mobile application Jawbone tracker transmit
longitude and latitude to its servers; these transmissions are
connected with the predefined user events, such as syncing
with the device and opening the application. These testing
described that this geological data has a precision of up to
fourteen decimal points and it effectively releases the
fitness device location within a few millimeters. It was
found that users did not know the location transmission
occurring when the Jawbone UP users restore his or her
timeline. The figure below shows the Jawbone UP tracker
sends a user’s exact location when the user connects with
smartphone application.

Strength of Google Glass: Google Glass basically
performs through user voice command [29]. Users can send
messages without using their hands and it has video and
camera capabilities that make a difference from other
wearable fitness devices such as Fitbit and Jawbone. These
glasses expose numerous distinct useful applications for
health organization and hospital staffs [30]. Video
conferences between doctors and medical associates is one
of the most unique features in Google Glasses [30]. Google
Glass facilitates a great amount of health cases throughout
the conference about patient treatment between medical
professionals and other co-facilitated health organizations.
Data Security of Google Glass: The connection system of
Google Glass is content-based image retrieval (CBIR) that
allows health staff to search accurate information for a
patient's medical history while consulting with physicians
and patients [31]. Apart from these facilities Google Glass
has a major concern about patient data security and privacy
[31]. Researchers find out Google Glass does not have a
concrete authentication process to protect the user’s data
security and privacy due to lack of secure enough PIN
system [32]. Google Glass privacy threat is significantly
different from other fitness tracker that relatively uses
mobile phone and apps to collect user data. Google Glass
supports eye movement tracking that may cause
authentication issues [32]. In addition, Sayed Mostafa and
Zarina [33] revealed that Google Glass is able to capture
user pictures and has a video recording capability which
would be an violation of users’ privacy without consent.
Most significantly, there are numerous factual cases
reported concerning data security and privacy associated
with this Google Glass when it was first released.

Figure 2 shows that Jawbone routinely transmits precise
geolocation information when users open the apps or
syncing their wearable to their iPhone [13]. The research
team found that Jawbone UP fitness data transmission
between mobile application and health devices servers
were generally secured using HTTPS. However, both
Android and iOS applications have vulnerability because
both applications create false generated fitness data for
their individual account. Although HTTPS is a secure
communication network between user and server, HTTPS
does not cover the security and privacy protection from end
users.

A research team [34] exposed a stern security threat on how
Google Glass interprets QR (Quick Response) codes while
it snaps a photo back and they found that Google Glass
could scan a malicious QR code that forces the device to
connect to a hostile Wi-Fi access point so man-in-middle
(MITM) can perform session hijacking or sniffing or
remotely gain root access to a Glass devices and take
control without the wearer’s knowledge – Google Glass
interprets QR(Quick Response) codes while snapping a
photo back. Moreover, the QR code is not only the way to
initiate the security breach, the sniffing or session hijacking
can be performed by man-in-the middle (MITM) attacks
and such an attack can be implemented without recognizing
any QR code by Google Glass devices [34].
Figure 2: Jawbone Up phone application share user precise
location while connecting.

Google Glass Bluetooth Communication: The Google
Glass Bluetooth pairing is comparatively the same as other
fitness devices. It is essential to pair Glass to phone or
tablet via MyGlass app from the Google play store that has
full use of Bluetooth capabilities [36]. There is a concern
that Google Glass battery gets drained more quickly while
connected through Bluetooth rather Wi-Fi connection [37].

C. Analysis of Google Glass
Google Glass is the earliest wearable device that boosts the
growth of wearable technology. Google Glass is the frame
of a pair of glasses which is built in a computer eyewear
device. It affords various structures that users feel very
comfortable to use it but google glass is only usable for
enterprise version that means the google glass is not
available for individual’s usage. However, many concerns
about users’ data security and privacy issues have
been raised from various researchers group that Google
Glass is not free from vulnerability and it could be
threatened for client data security and privacy.

IV.

COMPARISON AND SOLUTION

We analyze the strength of the selected devices, connection
capabilities, and data storage structure. We also analyze the
security and privacy concerns for the three selected
devices. It is found that there are a number of
vulnerabilities and chances that user data are compromised
or gained by middle-of-the-man although there are a lot of
4

improvements that have taken place by the device
manufacturers. The security vulnerabilities and potential
security attacks on the wearable devices are summarized in
Table 1.

features by adding extra hardware which manufacturers
would worry about the device weight and user experience.
3) Cost Down: Due to fierce competition in this market,
the fitness devices generally cannot priced too high, which
would be a possible cause for not having sufficient memory
space and lack-of-quality coding leading to the failure of
the strengthening of devices security.

Table 1 shows that the selected wearable devices are not
free from common security vulnerability as well as the
devices have been chosen for analyses having a lack of
authentication. Without implementing proper security
authentication, the devices can be accessed by
unauthorized activities such as eavesdropping, DoS and
Brute force attacks. Table 1 also shows that Jawbone
Devices can reveal exact location that users recently
visited. Thus, DoS attack can be deciphered and third
parties can easily get access to the device. Similarly,
Google Glasses are major privacy issues since glasses are
capable of taking pictures and recording without people's
knowledge. Therefore, eavesdropping and spyware attack
can take place.

Fitness Tracker’s Secure Communication Model: Builtin-security mechanism is one of the most important
features for the user authentication process because it
generates the secure PIN system. Secure PIN system
protects unauthorized access in a device or system because
it tends to store data without encryption. Cyber-attack often
takes place due to poor security management that causes
the devices extremely vulnerable. The hacker could control
every single aspect of the device through initial injection
that calls firmware attack which allows attackers’ access to
local data storage. After a successful firmware attack, the
devices are open for modification, encrypted key or
Bluetooth functionality. As a result, attackers could send or
inject random value into memory as a step count to the
server as a valid encrypted frames [35].

Table 1: Comparison of Security Vulnerability and
Attacks for Fitbit, Jawbone and Google Glass
Wearable
Devices

Security Vulnerability

Attacks

Fitbit
Device

Week authentication
Drainage BTLE (Bluetooth
Low Energy Technology)
Privacy: Tracked visited
location

Data injection,
DoS and Battery
Drain hacks
Easily Tracked

Jawbone

Lacking of Privacy Features
Exact location tracked

Denial of Service

Google
Glass

Unsecure PIN
Privacy: Unauthorized
picture and video recording
capable
Unauthorized Eye
movement
Unsecure Network and
hostile environment
For Wi-Fi setup require QR
code

Wi-Fi hijacking
Eavesdropping
and spyware
Easy recording
system by people
nearby due to
gesture base
authentication
scheme
QR
photobombing
malware

Suggestions to add Security to Fitness Trackers: The
following initiative and practice help cover the minimal
security and privacy of fitness trackers:
1) Regular firmware needs to be updated or developed for
all fitness devices. Gadget LE privacy and changes of MAC
address should be required at randomly periodical times,
such every ten minutes.
2)While a wearable device pairing with mobile phone, the
wearable firmware should include fixed and private
Identity Resolving Key (IRK).
3) In general, wearable firmware MAC addresses are
permanent that cause theft of localhost address. But if the
wearable firmware randomly generates new MAC
addresses every 10 minutes on IRK, hackers would not be
able to identify the host address number [13].

V. CONCLUSION
In this survey paper, we analyzed three smart health
devices, Fitbit, Jawbone and Google Glass and
summarized the security vulnerability found in prior
research. User data on these devices could be compromised
through Bluetooth connection to mobile applications that
push and pull data from cloud server. Communication
between server and app is found secure but MAC address
could cause a significant data leak from devices. While all
three devices provide a reasonable level of privacy and data
security overall, the prior research calls for a concrete and
secure data rest on server for those health devices as this
would provide more user data security and privacy.

Data Securing within Mobile Health Devices: Data
security is a major concern of mHealth devices. Fitness
tracker are widely adopted and are easy to use. There are
many concerns about lacking data security in fitness
devices and it often escalates to the extremely vulnerable
risks for users [35]. The following is a summary of the
reasons for lacking data security and privacy in mHealth
devices:
1) Lack of testing: Fitness devices are constantly updating
their features due to market competition so there would be
possible rushes to release products or the new features to
the marketplace. As a result, there may be lack of proper
testing and strong security coding overlook [35].
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